Abstract : A time-coding quantum key distribution protocol at telecommunication wavelength is investigated over a 25 km channel. Measured 98 % visibility and 2 % QBER enable 200 km security range and 1 kbit/sec secret key rates.
Introduction
Quantum key distribution has been widely developed in recent years [1] . In view of practical applications we have proposed a simple protocol based on time coding that makes use of coherent single-photon pulses with square profile and duration T [2, 3] . The key is encoded in the photon time detection. The security is obtained performing measurements in the frequency domain as well, using an interferometer. The advantage of this protocol is a simple implementation, a potential high rate and an immunity to the depolarization occurring in standard telecommunication fibers. In addition, the protocol is one-way, which makes the security evaluation easier.
Emitter, Alice, and receiver, Bob, share a common clock. The time domain after each clock signal is divided in time-slots of duration T/2. First, Alice sends at random bit 0 pulses spanning the time-slots 1 and 2 as well as bit 1 pulses spanning the time-slots 2 and 3 ( fig. 1 ). These overlapping kind of pulses thus correspond to non-orthogonal states, which is at the origin of the security of the protocol [2] . Additionally, Alice can send ancillary pulses of duration T/2 preventing an eavesdropper to modify the channel transmission. The pulses are then sent to the interferometer having a T/2 propagation delay between the two arms. Thus, any change in the pulse duration modifies the visibility measured by Bob [2] . Bob measures the photon time-detection at the output of the interferometer for each pulse he receives in order to establish the raw key. An incoming bit 0 results in a possible photon detection in time-slots 1, 2 and 3 with interference occurring in 2. For an incoming bit 1, the output is similar but for time-slots 2, 3 and 4 ( fig. 2) . A detection in 1 and 4 allows Bob to know which bit has been sent by Alice, allowing to construct the sifted key. After error correction and privacy amplification, Alice and Bob share a common secret key. Detections in 2 and 3 are not involved in the key. For the corresponding pulses, Alice can then reveals her choice of bit, which allows Bob to evaluate the interferometer visibility equal to 1 for an ideal set-up.
Experimental setup
Figure 1 : Alice set-up. A cw diode laser at 1550 nm is modulated to produce 20 ns square pulses that can be delayed by 10 ns with respect to the clock at 1310 nm. Bob set-up : after demultiplexing the clock, the pulse is sent to a Michelson interferometer. The two outputs are sent to a photon-counter (SSPD). The time detection of the photon is compared to the clock reference. Processing the measurements allows to evaluate both the QBER and the fringe visibility.
The experimental set-up ( fig. 1 ) is entirely made with telecommunication components. In Alice set-up, a telecom DFB diode laser at 1550 nm is modulated to produce 20 ns square pulses which can be delayed by 10 ns to encode Bob first demultiplexes the clock pulse from the signal pulse and use it as a time reference. The signal pulse is sent to a Michelson interferometer with a 10 ns propagation delay between the two arms. These ones are terminated by Faraday mirrors allowing for fiber drift compensation. Both outputs of the interferometer are time-multiplexed allowing the use of only one photon-counter. This one is a superconducting single photon detector (SSPD) [4] with an efficiency of 9.6 % , a jitter lower than 200 ps and a dark-count rate as low as 10 counts per second.
Experimental results.
Figure 2 : measurements performed over 2 hours. Curve (a) : histograms of time detection delays at the output ports of the interferometer. A proper data analysis allows to retrieve the bits 0 and bits 1 and to evaluate the interferometer visibility in photon counting regime leading to a 2 % average QBER (b) and a 98 % visibility (c) measured as a function of time.
All measurements ( fig. 2 ) are performed in photon-counting regime. In order to characterize the set-up, Alice sends alternatively bits 0 and bits 1 with a period of 250 ns. For each photon detection, Bob measures the timestamp, allowing to identify the pulse number in the sequence and the delay with respect to the clock. The time delays histograms, featuring four 10 ns time-slots for each output port, are given on part (a). The first and the fourth timeslots allow to identify the bit value. In part (b), the quantum bit error rate (QBER) is evaluated comparing the bit sequence of Bob and the corresponding one of Alice. In part (c), the interferometer visibility is evaluated from timeslots 2 and 3 after proper data processing. Long term stability measurements (2 hours) result in an average QBER of 2 % and in a fringe visibility of 98 % attributed to the imperfections of the interferometer.
A high amount of information per pulse, resulting from the low QBER, combined with the 4 MHz repetition rate allows to foresee a high secret key rate comparable to those obtained recently (over 1 kbit/sec at 25 km) [5] .
Preliminary results on the security evaluation of our protocol taking into account collective attacks show that, with a visibility close to 1, the maximum allowable QBER is 12% similarly to the case of the BB84 protocol. From that value and taking into account the measured dark-count rate and the useful time-slot duration of 10 ns, we can evaluate a maximum secure range over 200 km [3] for usual optical fibers with 0.2 dB/km attenuation.
Conclusion
We have evaluated the time-coding QKD protocol on a simple set-up making use of superconducting single photon detectors. The tests have been performed over a 25 km propagation distance. The measured 2% QBER and 98% visibility allow to foresee secret bit rates in the kbps range. The secure distance is evaluated to be over 200 km, which surpasses the usually admitted secure distance of 100 km obtained with InGaAs photon-counters. This is in part due to the low dark-count rate of the detectors which can even be further improved. The development of such simple long-range protocols can be of great importance in the objective of inter-city QKD links. a1922_1.pdf JWA107.pdf
